Fw: [BITES-L] bites Sep. 3/10

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Subject: [BITES-L] bites Sep. 3/10

bites Sep. 3/10

Salmonella in eggs: USDA graders and auditors were around filthy facilities, did they say anything?

Two salmonella outbreaks not related to DeCoster eggs

8 sick with E. coli O157:H7 in Huron County, Michigan

Will E. coli O26 in beef recall lead to tightened rules?

Food Safety Infosheet: Soyez prêt pendant les orages

Multiple-serotype salmonella gastroenteritis outbreak after a reception --- CONNECTICUT, 2009

CHINA moves to improve food safety systems

TEXAS: Restaurant violations

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Salmonella in eggs: USDA graders and auditors were around filthy facilities, did they say anything?
03.sep.10
barfblog
Doug Powell
http://www.barfblog.com/blog/143930/10/09/03/salmonella-eggs-usda-graders-and-auditors-were-around-filthy-facilities-did-the
Alison Young of USA Today reports today U.S. Department of Agriculture staff regularly on site at two Iowa egg processors implicated in a national salmonella outbreak were supposed to enforce rules against the presence of disease-spreading rodents and other vermin, federal regulations show.
Doug Powell, an associate professor of food safety at Kansas State University, said regulations are only as good as their enforcement, adding, "It goes back to the responsibility of whoever is producing the food. How do you establish a corporate culture where people pay attention to food safety?"
The USDA egg graders, part of an industry-paid program, were at Wright County Egg and Hillandale Farms at least 40 hours a week — including before the outbreak — inspecting the size and quality of eggs inside processing buildings.
Though USDA regulations say buildings and "outside premises" must be free of conditions that harbor vermin, the agency takes a narrow view of its responsibilities. Under the USDA's unwritten interpretation of the regulations, egg graders only look for vermin inside the specific processing building where they are based, said Dean Kastner, an assistant USDA branch chief in poultry grading program.
The agency interprets outside premises as only the area immediately around the processing building's loading dock and trash receptacle, he said.
Salmonella can be spread by rodents and wild birds. Outbreak investigators from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) this week released reports documenting filthy conditions in and around egg laying barns at the two companies, including rodents, rodent holes, wild birds, flies and other vermin.
Hillandale Farms spokeswoman Julie DeYoung said the barns at its facility are about 50 feet from the processing building. At Wright County Egg, the laying barns are 50 feet apart and connected to the processing plant, said spokeswoman Hinda Mitchell.
Associated Press subsequently reported two former workers at Wright County Egg facilities, Robert and Deanna Arnold, say they reported problems such as leaking manure and dead chickens to USDA employees but were ignored and told to return to work.
The salmonella outbreak has led to a recall of about 550 million eggs.
http://www.usatoday.com/yourlife/food/safety/2010-09-02-eggregulations2_ST_N.htm
http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5jIBlfmCkZWBya_0ZGheJsFdGC3aAD9I09VLG0

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Two salmonella outbreaks not related to DeCoster eggs
03.sep.10
barfblog
Doug Powell
http://www.barfblog.com/blog/143931/10/09/03/two-salmonella-outbreaks-not-related-decoster-eggs
Salmonella is everywhere. And while the salmonella-in-eggs-from-Iowa outbreak is capturing media attention, other outbreaks continue.
The LaCrosse Tribune reports that salmonella poisoning did sicken about 30 people in Vernon County, Wisconsin late last week, but the illness is not thought to be connected to the recent nationwide egg recall.
The Wisconsin Lab of Hygiene confirmed Tuesday that patients who came into Vernon Memorial Healthcare had salmonella poisoning, Vernon County Health Department Director Beth Johnson said.
All of the cases were related to people who attended the same private party, Johnson said, and no local businesses or restaurants were involved.
While eggs are suspected in the outbreak, "it has nothing to do with the current egg recall," she said.
Meanwhile, a popular Mexican restaurant near Bakersfield, Calif., was forced to shut their doors Thursday, after four people were sickened with salmonella poisoning. Two of them remain hospitalized.
The Kern County health department says Don Perico may be the common denominator in these illnesses.
The sign posted on the restaurant's front doors says the restaurant is remodeling, but the health department says they're the ones who closed the doors. "There had been some past examples of significant violations," said Matt Constantine with the Health Department. "We have worked through them, we have allowed them to stay open. But in this case because of the potential health risk we took immediate action."
http://lacrossetribune.com/news/local/article_817c4ef4-b578-11df-99c6-001cc4c03286.html
http://www.turnto23.com/news/24865207/detail.html

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8 sick with E. coli O157:H7 in Huron County, Michigan
03.sep.10
barfblog
Doug Powell
http://www.barfblog.com/blog/143925/10/09/03/8-sick-e-coli-o157h7-huron-county-michigan
Traverse City, Michigan, is not in the upper peninsula, or UP.
I'm sorry.
But something's going on in Michigan, where last week several people were confirmed sick with shigatoxin-producing E. coli, and late Wednesday, Huron County health types announced several children and one adult are experiencing gastrointestinal (bowel) infections which are presumed to be E. coli O157:H7.
The Huron County Health Department issued a release Wednesday afternoon. with the usual snappy soundbites like,
"Some people may experience only mild diarrhea or no symptoms at all,"
and,
"Eating meat that is rare or inadequately cooked is the most common way of getting the infection."
Maybe, but I doubt it. Cross contamination could be a bigger cause, based on direct observation of people in commercial or home kitchens.
http://barfblog.foodsafety.ksu.edu/blog/143811/10/08/24/e-coli-cases-linked-fair-michigan
http://www.michigansthumb.com/articles/2010/09/02/news/local_news/doc4c7f97ff7e1cb750608555.txt

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Will E. coli O26 in beef recall lead to tightened rules?
03.sep.10
barfblog
Doug Powell
http://www.barfblog.com/blog/143929/10/09/03/will-e-coli-o26-beef-recall-lead-tightened-rules
William Neuman of the New York Times writes this morning that for the first time in the U.S., public health officials have linked ground beef to illnesses from a rare strain of E. coli, adding fuel to an already fierce debate over expanding federal rules meant to keep the toxic bacteria out of the meat supply.
Cargill Meat Solutions recalled 8,500 pounds of hamburger on Saturday after investigators determined that it was the likely source of a bacterial strain known as E. coli O26, which had sickened three people in Maine and New York.
Under federal rules, it is illegal to sell ground beef containing a more common strain of the bacteria, E. coli O157:H7, which has been responsible for thousands of illnesses, many deaths and the recall of millions of pounds of beef over the years. But federal regulators are now considering whether to give the same illegal status to at least six other E. coli strains, including O26, which can also make people violently sick.
The meat industry has opposed such a change, saying it is not needed. Among the arguments the industry has used was one stubborn fact: no outbreak in this country from the rarer strains of E. coli had ever been definitively tied to ground beef.
James Marsden, a professor of food safety and security at Kansas State University, said about the outbreak and recall,
"It might act as a catalyst. Clearly it's back on the front burner, that's for sure, and clearly USDA is under pressure."
The federal Agriculture Department has been trying for several years to decide what to do about the additional strains of E. coli. The issue now falls in the lap of the Obama administration's new head of food safety at the department, Dr. Elisabeth Hagen, who was appointed last month.
Dr. Hagen has yet to say publicly what she plans to do. But in a written statement provided to The New York Times, she said, "In order to best prevent illnesses and deaths from dangerous E. coli in beef, our policies need to evolve to address a broader range of these pathogens, beyond E.coli O157:H7. … Our approach should ensure that public health and food safety policy keeps pace with the demonstrated advances in science and data about foodborne illness to best protect consumers."
The agency has said that it is reluctant to make additional forms of toxic E. coli illegal in ground beef until it has developed a rapid test that can detect those strains in packing plants. Such tests are not expected to be ready until at least late next year.
The beef industry argued against declaring the additional E. coli strains illegal in an Aug. 18 letter that the American Meat Institute, a trade group, sent to the agriculture secretary, Tom Vilsack.
Giving the strains illegal status could "cause more harm than good," the letter said, by forcing costly testing when resources would be better spent on measures to prevent bacteria from getting into the meat in the first place.
It said that measures the industry had taken to combat the most common strain of E. coli were also effective against the other strains, and it urged the agency to conduct further studies before making a decision.
James H. Hodges, the meat institute's executive vice president, said that a single outbreak did not alter the industry's position.
"We have never said it wasn't a potential public health problem. The debate is what's the appropriate regulatory program."
And once again, J. Patrick Boyle, president of the American Meat Institute, going mano-a-mano with Stephen Colbert on issues like non-O157 STECs.
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/03/business/03beef.html?_r=2&partner=rss&emc=rss
http://barfblog.foodsafety.ksu.edu/blog/143873/10/08/28/seek-and-ye-shall-find-cargill-recalls-hamburger-because-e-coli-o26-3-sick-main

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Food Safety Infosheet: Soyez prêt pendant les orages
02.sep.12
bites
Benjamin Chapman
Translated by Albert Amgar
http://www.barfblog.com/blog/143928/10/09/03/food-safety-infosheet-soyez-pr%C3%AAt-pendant-les-orages
Si il n'y plus de courant, que puis-je conserver ?
Les aliments qui peuvent être conservé de façon sécuritaire au-dessus de 5°C pendant quelques jours sont :
Les fruits et les végétaux frais non coupés,
Le ketchup, les condiments, les olives, les confitures et les gelées, la moutarde, la sauce barbecue, la sauce soja, le pain, les petits pains, les bagels, les gâteaux (sans crème, ni fourrage), les biscuits et les muffins et certains fromages à pâte dure.
Conserver les portes fermées de votre réfrigérateur et de votre congélateur aussi longtemps que possible pour maintenir une température froide. Vous pouvez recongeler de façon sécuritaire des aliments qui contiennent encore des cristaux de glace ou qui ont été conservés à 5°C ou en dessous.
Avec la porte fermée, les aliments dans la plupart des congélateurs vont rester en dessous de 5°C pendant au moins 3 jours, même en été.
La vitesse de décongélation dépend de :
• la quantité d'aliments présente dans le congélateur
• la nature des aliments
• la température de l'aliment
• la taille et l'isolation du congélateur
Remplir l'espace vide de votre congélateur avec de la glace pour aider à les aliments congelés à rester plus longtemps lorsque le courant est coupé.
Soyez préparé lorsque le courant est coupé
• Placer un thermomètre dans votre réfrigérateur et votre congélateur
• ayez un thermomètre digital sensible à lecteur rapide pour vérifier les aliments
• Ayez des aliments qui ne nécessite pas une réfrigération et qui peuvent être mangé froid ou chauffé avec un grill d'extérieur
• Congeler des poches d'eau pour en faire de la glace et aider ainsi à conserver froid les aliments dans les réfrigérateurs et les congélateurs
• Prévoyez à l'avance en préparant des glacières et en sachant où se trouvent de la glace sèche et des fournisseurs de blocs de glace
Les ouragans et les orages peuvent entraîner une coupure de courant et conduire à des problèmes de sécurité des aliments
Protégez vos aliments en étant prepare

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Multiple-serotype salmonella gastroenteritis outbreak after a reception --- CONNECTICUT, 2009
03.sep.10
CDC
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5934a1.htm?s_cid=mm5934a1_x
In September 2009, the Connecticut Department of Public Health (DPH) identified an outbreak of Salmonella gastroenteritis among attendees at a reception. A case-control study and environmental and laboratory investigations were conducted. Nine case-patients and 14 control subjects were identified. Potato salad consumption was strongly associated with illness (odds ratio [OR] = 84.0). During the investigation, food service workers were observed to have bare-handed contact with ready-to-eat food. Five case-patients and one asymptomatic food service worker had stool samples positive for Salmonella species. Two Salmonella serotypes were identified, Salmonella enterica serovar Schwarzengrund and Salmonella enterica serovar Typhimurium variant O:5--, including coinfection in one case-patient and one food service worker. The isolates of each respective serotype (S. Schwarzengrund and S. Typhimurium variant O:5--) had indistinguishable pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE) patterns. Potato salad was the likely source of the outbreak but the contamination mechanism is unclear. Control measures included exclusion of the food service worker with Salmonella-positive stool from the restaurant until two consecutive stool samples yielded no bacterial growth. Standard public health laboratory practices in Connecticut and testing techniques used specifically during this investigation led to the rapid identification of the two serotypes. Multiple-serotype Salmonella outbreaks might occur more frequently than recognized; knowledge of all Salmonella serotypes involved in an outbreak might help implicate the outbreak source, define the scope of the outbreak, and determine the selection of appropriate control measures.
On September 18, 2009, a physician notified the DPH Epidemiology and Emerging Infections Program of a laboratory-confirmed Salmonella infection in a person who had attended a reception at a banquet hall on September 6. Preliminary information indicated that other attendees became symptomatic with gastrointestinal illness after the reception. Food served at the reception was prepared at an off-site licensed restaurant, delivered to the banquet hall by restaurant staff, and set up as a self-serve buffet. DPH and the local health department conducted an investigation to determine the source and extent of the illnesses and to recommend control measures.
A case-control study was conducted among attendees. A case was defined as diarrhea (three or more loose stools during a 24-hour period) in a reception attendee within 5 days after the reception. A control subject was defined as an attendee who did not experience gastrointestinal illness. Because no guest list existed, contact information for ill attendees was provided by the reception host; control subjects and additional case-patients were recruited by asking known attendees to identify and provide contact information for other attendees. Contact information was obtained for 25 (17%) of the approximately 150 attendees. DPH conducted telephone interviews during September 21--25 regarding illness history and food consumed at the reception; an itemized list of foods served at the reception was used to obtain food consumption histories. Of the 25 interviewed attendees, nine (36%) met the case definition, 14 qualified as control subjects, and two were excluded because they reported gastrointestinal illness that did not meet the case definition. Of the nine case-patients, eight (89%) had abdominal cramping, seven (78%) had subjective fever, six (67%) had muscle aches, and four (44%) had bloody stools (Table). Median age was 31 years (range: 25--51 years); five (56%) were male. The median incubation period* was 13.5 hours (range: 9.5--95.5 hours); median illness duration was 8.5 days (range: 0.5--14 days). A case-control analysis revealed that case-patients were significantly more likely than control subjects to have consumed potato salad (88% versus 8%, respectively; OR = 84.0; 95% confidence interval = 3.3--4,077; p<0.001).
During September 21--October 1, the local health department and the DPH Food Protection Program conducted an environmental investigation of the restaurant in which the food served at the reception had been prepared. Of the four persons who worked at the restaurant, two were directly involved in food preparation for the reception. All four were interviewed, and none reported experiencing gastrointestinal illness. During the investigation, food service workers were observed to have bare-handed contact with ready-to-eat food and did not practice adequate hand washing. Preparation procedures of items served at the reception, including the potato salad, were reviewed, and environmental samples of food contact surfaces and spices used in preparation of the reception food were collected for testing. The environmental and spice samples were obtained >3 weeks after the outbreak occurred and after the facility had been cleaned; Salmonella was not detected in these samples. No leftover potato salad was available for testing.
The stool sample from the index case-patient was collected on September 14 and processed at a private laboratory; the clinical isolate was then sent to the DPH laboratory for confirmation. Stool specimens from five additional case-patients and all four food service workers were collected during September 21--October 7 and tested at the DPH laboratory. The specimens were first plated to selective media to test for the presence of Salmonella, Shigella, Campylobacter, and Escherichia coli O157. After incubation, presumptive Salmonella colonies were serotyped† and subtyped genetically by PFGE. Serotyping and PFGE testing were not sequential.§
The isolate from the index case-patient was serotyped as S. Typhimurium variant O:5--. Initial serotyping steps performed on Salmonella isolates obtained from stool specimens revealed a preliminary antigen result consistent with the S. Typhimurium variant O:5-- already identified for the index case-patient. Consequently, investigators assumed that S. Typhimurium variant O:5-- was the only outbreak serotype. Next, while final serotyping was pending, Salmonella isolates were submitted for PFGE. Testing of the first five isolates yielded two distinct PFGE patterns (PFGE XbaI patterns JPXX01.0456 and JM6X01.0036¶). One PFGE pattern appeared to be consistent with S. Typhimurium; the other appeared to be consistent with S. Schwarzengrund. The results of serotyping verified the presence of both S. Typhimurium variant O:5-- and S. Schwarzengrund.
The identification of both S. Typhimurium variant O:5-- and S. Schwarzengrund in reception attendees raised the possibility that two different Salmonella serotypes might be involved in the outbreak. Therefore, laboratory staff systematically collected multiple single-colony picks from original media to screen for the presence of an additional Salmonella serotype. After all testing was complete, including isolation, serotyping, and PFGE, two of the six case-patients with specimens at the DPH laboratory were determined to be infected with S. Typhimurium variant O:5--, another two with S. Schwarzengrund, and one with both; no pathogens were isolated from the stool specimen of the sixth case-patient. A seventh case-patient's stool specimen was tested at a private laboratory; no Salmonella was detected. Of the four food service worker specimens tested, one yielded both S. Schwarzengrund and S. Typhimurium variant O:5-- and the other three were negative. All respective S. Schwarzengrund isolates and S. Typhimurium variant O:5-- isolates had indistinguishable PFGE patterns.
On September 25, the food service worker with positive stool findings was reinterviewed and reaffirmed the absence of recent gastrointestinal illness, including around the time of the reception. This food service worker had been responsible for transporting food to the banquet hall and ensuring that the food was maintained at the correct temperature before serving, but reported not having prepared, consumed, nor served any of the food.
Control measures implemented by the local health department included exclusion of the Salmonella-positive food service worker from the restaurant for approximately 2 weeks until two consecutive stool cultures obtained ≥24 hours apart had no bacterial growth. Health department staff members provided information about employee health policies and employee hygiene to the restaurant owners and reviewed the information with them.
Reported by
L Mank, MS, M Mandour, Connecticut Dept of Public Health Laboratory; T Rabatsky-Ehr, MPH, Q Phan, MPH, J Krasnitski, MPH, J Brockmeyer, MPH, L Bushnell, C Applewhite, M Cartter, MD, Connecticut Dept of Public Health. J Kattan, MD, EIS Officer, CDC.
Editorial Note
Epidemiologic and laboratory data demonstrate that an outbreak of Salmonella infection with two different serotypes occurred among guests who attended a reception; potato salad was the likely source of this outbreak, but the contamination mechanism is unclear. Likewise, whether the food service worker might have unknowingly contaminated a food item or whether the food service worker also was infected through the same source as the case-patients remains unclear.
Salmonella is the most common bacterial cause of foodborne disease outbreaks in the United States (1). However, outbreaks of Salmonella infection with multiple serotypes are reported less commonly in the literature (2--4). Standard public health laboratory practices in Connecticut,** as well as testing techniques used specifically in the context of this outbreak investigation, led to the rapid identification of two distinct serotypes. Connecticut requires all identified Salmonella isolates to be submitted to the DPH laboratory, where serotyping and PFGE are routinely performed; private laboratories in Connecticut do not have the capacity to perform full serotyping and PFGE testing. Initiating PFGE testing before finalization of serotyping led to more rapid recognition of the two different serotypes; complete serotyping can take days, whereas PFGE testing can take as little as 1 day after pure isolate is available for analysis.
Systematically screening and testing multiple single-colony picks on each original culture plate, a time-intensive practice that is usually not part of routine laboratory protocol, facilitated identifying both outbreak serotypes. This approach particularly aided discovery of coinfection with two Salmonella serotypes in one case-patient and the food service worker. The recognition of coinfection helped investigators conclude that a multiple-serotype outbreak had occurred. Furthermore, testing multiple colonies is dependent upon availability of stool specimens; had all of the case-patients' stool been first tested at a private laboratory, such that only single clinical isolates were available for testing at the DPH laboratory, coinfection in the case-patient would not have been discovered.
Not all states require that all Salmonella isolates be submitted to the public health laboratory for serotyping and PFGE. Additionally, in an outbreak setting, some states with resource limitations might only perform comprehensive testing on a very limited number of case-patient specimens. If the outbreak described in this report had taken place in a state without a requirement for submission of Salmonella isolates to the public health laboratory or in a state in which the number of specimens tested was strictly limited, the discovery of both Salmonella serotypes might not have occurred. In those public health laboratories that perform both serotype and PFGE testing, but do not do so simultaneously, multiple-serotype infections would not be identified as quickly as they were in this outbreak.
Although not specifically illustrated by the findings in this report, not knowing about all Salmonella serotypes involved in an outbreak might hinder the epidemiologic investigation and the public health response. Certain Salmonella serotypes are known to be likely associated with particular food types or animal sources. Consequently, knowledge of multiple serotypes involved in an outbreak can help focus the investigation on potential outbreak sources. Databases, such as PulseNet,†† can identify and link infected persons to a particular outbreak, thereby defining the scope. In a recent outbreak, PulseNet matched two different Salmonella serotypes to an outbreak linked to peppers used in making salami (4). If an outbreak were detected through PulseNet, not knowing all involved serotypes might result in cases not being associated with the outbreak. If only cases with a single serotype were included in such responses, sampled cases might not be representative of all cases. Furthermore, identifying a greater number of cases associated with multiple serotypes in an outbreak might increase the statistical power of the study to implicate a food vehicle or other outbreak source through epidemiologic analysis. Implementation of appropriate control measures relies on knowing the implicated source and the scope of the outbreak, particularly if multiple serotypes are involved.
The findings in this report are subject to at least three limitations. First, lack of a comprehensive guest list prohibited a cohort analysis. Second, recruitment of control subjects through known attendees might have introduced selection bias; attendees who knew each other might have had similar food preferences, potentially increasing the likelihood that case-patient and control subject food histories were similar. However, such a tendency would bias the results toward showing no association. Finally, the time lag between the reception and collection of environmental samples limited their usefulness.
Multiple-serotype Salmonella outbreaks might occur more frequently than recognized. Health departments should be aware of the possible occurrence of such outbreaks to better characterize their epidemiology. This outbreak demonstrates the importance of capacity to perform Salmonella serotyping and PFGE testing at public health laboratories. In outbreak settings, obtaining stool samples and performing comprehensive serotyping and PFGE at public health laboratories facilitate detection of multiple Salmonella serotypes. When more than one Salmonella serotype is suspected in an outbreak, screening and testing multiple single-colony picks could be considered, if resources permit, as an important technique for identifying multiple serotypes, including coinfection, among cases.
Acknowledgments
This report is based, in part, on contributions by local health department staff; K Desy, MPH, K Purviance, MPH, L Sosa, MD, Connecticut Dept of Public Health; A Kinney, D Barden, J Fontana, PhD, Connecticut Dept of Public Health Laboratory; J Hadler, MD, Connecticut Emerging Infections Program; and J Magri, MD, and I Williams, PhD, CDC.
References
CDC. Surveillance for foodborne disease outbreaks---United States, 2006. MMWR 2009;58;609--15.
Taylor JL, Dwyer DM, Groves C, et al. Simultaneous outbreak of Salmonella enteritidis and Salmonella Schwarzengrund in a nursing home: association of S. enteritidis with bacteremia and hospitalization. J Infect Dis 1993;167:781--2.
Sotir MJ, Ewald G, Kimura AC, et al. Outbreak of Salmonella Wandsworth and Typhimurium infections in infants and toddlers traced to a commercial vegetable-coated snack food. Pediatr Infect Dis J 2009;28:1041--6.
CDC. Investigation update: multistate outbreak of human Salmonella Montevideo infections. Atlanta, GA: US Department of Health and Human Services, CDC; 2010. Available at http://www.cdc.gov/salmonella/montevideo/index.html. Accessed July 16, 2010.
* Meal service began at approximately 6 p.m. The incubation period was calculated using 7:30 p.m. as the likely time by which all case-patients had eaten food.
† Salmonella serotypes are based on the immunoreactivity of two surface structures, the O antigen and the H antigen. Serotyping was performed according to the Kauffmann-White Scheme. Additional information available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dbmd/phlisdata/salmtab/2006/salmonellaannualsummary2006.pdf .
§ Salmonella isolates were first screened for O antigens by using the slide agglutination method, a process that usually takes <1 minute to perform. Screening for H antigens was done by a tube agglutination test, a process that can take days to complete. While the H antigen test was pending, a fresh culture generated from a single-colony pick from the selective media underwent PFGE testing; single-colony picks from different persons' samples were run on the same PFGE gel. Because H antigen and PFGE testing ran concurrently, the PFGE results were typically available before H antigen testing was complete, and therefore, before the final serotype was known.
¶ PFGE pattern names were assigned by CDC's PulseNet database.
** Connecticut is a participant in the Foodborne Diseases Active Surveillance Network (FoodNet), the principle foodborne disease component of CDC's Emerging Infections Program (EIP). FoodNet is a collaborative project between CDC, 10 EIP sites, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, and the Food and Drug Administration. As part of FoodNet, Connecticut conducts active, laboratory-based surveillance of foodborne bacterial and parasitic pathogens. Additional information is available at http://www.cdc.gov/foodnet.
†† PulseNet is a national network of laboratories in which participants submit PFGE results on certain types of bacterial isolates; the database is available on demand to participants, allowing for rapid comparison of PFGE patterns. Additional information is available at http://www.cdc.gov/pulsenet.
What is already known on this topic?
Salmonella commonly causes foodborne illness; however, Salmonella outbreaks involving multiple serotypes are reported less commonly.
What does this report add?
Epidemiologic and laboratory data demonstrate that an outbreak of Salmonella infection with two different serotypes occurred among guests who attended a reception; rapid identification of the multiple serotypes was facilitated by confirmatory testing at the state laboratory, specifically the use of stool samples for subsequent serotyping and pulsed-field gel electrophoreses testing.
What are the implications for public health practice?
Multiple-serotype Salmonella outbreaks might occur more frequently than recognized; if resources permit, health departments can better characterize the epidemiology of Salmonella outbreaks by performing serotyping and PFGE, and by testing multiple single-colony picks when multiple Salmonella serotypes are suspected.

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CHINA moves to improve food safety systems
03.sep.10
CriEnglish
http://english.cri.cn/6909/2010/09/03/1781s592718.htm
China's food monitoring and risk assessment systems are to be upgraded with new technologies and more funding, said a government report received by Xinhua Friday.
The report was submitted to China's top legislature by a food safety office under the State Council, or the Cabinet, which gave an account of the government's work in implementing the Food Safety Law.
To improve assessment of safety risks of food and agricultural products, the government had already drawn up regulations and set up national expert commissions, it said.
The government would work to build a more extensive safety risk assessment system, make assessment more scientific and standardized, and broaden its information monitoring, it said.
The report said the Ministry of Health had established 31 food safety monitor centers at provincial level and 312 at county level, while the Ministry of Agriculture had expanded monitoring of quality safety of agricultural products to 259 big and medium cities.
However, it noted that China's food safety monitoring was still in its infancy and was technologically weak, and said government departments would increase spending, among other measures, to improve monitoring.

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TEXAS: Restaurant violations
03.sep.10
Lubbock Avalanche-Journal
http://lubbockonline.com/restaurants/2010-09-03/restaurant-violations
Restaurant reports for the week ending Aug. 29:
No critical violations:
• Bean Elementary School, 3001 Ave. N
• Cafe J (Bar No. 2), 2605 19th St.
• Carillon (Hobnob), 1717 Norfolk Ave.
• Carillon (Skilight), 1717 Norfolk Ave.
•Carillon (Starlight), 1717 Norfolk Ave.
•Dollar General No. 6935, 9604 University Ave.
•Dollar General No. 10144, 10404 Slide Road
•Dunbar Middle School, 2010 E. 26th St.
•Giorgio's Pizza, 1018 Broadway
•Guadalupe Elementary School, 101 N. Ave. P
•Hodges Elementary School, 5001 Ave. P
•J Bar J Ice Cream (Mobile No. 1), 7803 Ave. X Ste. A
•J Bar J Ice Cream (Mobile No. 2), 7803 Ave. X Ste. A
•Kids Are Cool, 7112 82nd St.
•Legends Chinese Restaurant, 6302 Frankford Ave. Ste. 3
•Logan's Roadhouse (Bar), 6251 Slide Road
•Lubbock Meals on Wheels, 2304 34th St.
• Parkway Elementary School, 406 N. Zenith Ave.
• Pizza Hut, 4401 82nd St.
• Ripley Do Da's, 5811 69th St.
• Sand Trap Club, 501 N. I-27
• O.L. Slaton Middle School, 1600 32nd St.
• Teacher's Touch Day Care, 5220 75th St.
• Triple J Chophouse and Brew Co. (Food Service), 1807 Buddy Holly Ave.
• Walgreens Drug Store, 6420 82nd St.
• Wee Care Child Center, 5502 19th St.
One critical violation:
• Bender Terrace, 4510 27th St. — food contact surfaces found soiled. Corrected on site.
• Cafe J (Food Service), 2605 19th St. — food contact surfaces found soiled. Corrected on site.
• Estacado High School, 1504 E. Itasca — food contact surfaces found soiled. Corrected on site.
• Grand Court, 4601 71st St. — food contact surfaces found soiled. Corrected on site.
• Harwell Elementary School, 4101 Ave. D — food contact surfaces found soiled. Corrected on site.
• Logan's Roadhouse (Food Service), 6251 Slide Road — food contact surfaces found soiled. Corrected on site.
• Taco Bueno, 5727 82nd St. — food contact surfaces found soiled. Corrected on site.
• Triple J Chophouse and Brew Co. (Bar), 1807 Buddy Holly Ave. — food contact surfaces found soiled. Corrected on site.
• New World Day Care No. 2, 2601 Slide Road — inadequate date-marking systems. Corrected on site.
Two or more critical violations:
• Cafe J (Bar #1), 2605 19th St. — inadequate handwashing facilities. Food contact surfaces found soiled. Corrected on site.
• Golden Corral, 5117 SW Loop 289 — improper employee handwashing. Food contact surfaces found soiled. Corrected on site.
• Home Plate Diner, 7615 University Ave. — good hygiene practices not followed. Food contact surfaces found soiled. Corrected on site.
• Stripes No. 2261, 5802 98th St. — hot hold food held at inadequate temperature. Observed possible cross-contamination. Corrected on site.
• Wing Stop, 6807 Slide Road — inadequate handwashing facilities. Toxic items stored improperly. Food contact surfaces found soiled. Corrected on site.
• Bless Your Heart, 3701 19th St. — cold hold food held at inadequate temperature. Good hygiene practices not followed. Toxic items labeled improperly. Food contact surface found soiled. Corrected on site.
• Wienerschnitzel No. 785, 6319 82nd St. Ste. 600 — improper employee handwashing. Good hygiene practices not followed. Observed sharply dented can. Toxic items stored improperly. Food contact surface found soiled. Corrected on site.
Compiled from City of Lubbock
Environmental Inspection Services.

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